Series is a forum for stimulating discussion and eliciting feedback on ongoing and recently completed research and policy studies undertaken by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) staff, consultants, or resource persons. The series deals with key economic and development problems, particularly those facing the Asia and Pacific region; as well as conceptual, analytical, or methodological issues relating to project/program economic analysis, and statistical data and measurement. The series aims to enhance the knowledge on Asia's development and policy challenges; strengthen analytical rigor and quality of ADB's country partnership strategies, and its subregional and country operations; and improve the quality and availability of statistical data and development indicators for monitoring development effectiveness.
I. Introduction
This paper analyzes the degree of structural transformation that the economy of the Kyrgyz Republic has undergone during 1992-2006. Applying the new approach developed by Hausmann and Klinger (2007) and Hidalgo et al. (2007) , we focus specifically on the level of sophistication of the country's exports, and discuss policy options to transform the country's production structure to achieving high and sustainable growth.
Structural transformation is the core issue of development for economists such as Chenerry, Kaldor, Hirschman, and Prebisch. In a review article, Syrquin (1988, 205) noted that "economic development is seen as an interrelated set of long-run processes of structural transformation that accompany growth". Successful Asian countries achieved remarkable growth through dynamic structural transformation. Structural transformation in these countries contained three components: first, output shifted from low-productivity into high-productivity activities, particularly manufacturing goods; second, the labor force moved from traditional activities in primary sectors into modern industry; and third, the export basket became more diversified and in the direction of more sophisticated products. These countries have become large-scale exporters of manufacturing goods of higher sophistication. Lucas (1993, 263) notes that: "a growth miracle sustained for decades involves the continual introduction of new goods, not merely continued learning on a fixed set of goods". Hausmann et al. (2005) analyze the implications of higher export sophistication for economic growth. They find that GDP per capita grows with the level of sophistication of the export basket, and that export sophistication robustly predicts subsequent growth. These findings matter: the goods that developing countries export today do affect their future growth. This departs from the standard comparative advantage argument, which emphasizes the benefits derived from specialization, irrespective of product sophistication.
The product space looks like a forest, where each tree corresponds to a product. An interesting point is that the forest is heterogeneous: in the dense part, many products are closely linked to each other; while in the periphery, products are only weakly linked to each other. To explain structural transformation, Hausmann and Klinger (2006) use the metaphor of a forest and monkeys. Structural transformation is the process where monkeys jump around from tree to tree. They argue that structural transformation tends to favor "nearby" products since they require similar capabilities that the country has already developed for the current exports. In the metaphor, monkeys can jump to nearby trees, but cannot easily jump to faraway trees. This implies "path-dependency" in structural transformation, and supports the finding by Hausmann et al. (2005) that export sophistication is a robust predictor of subsequent growth.
Developing countries need to diversify their economies toward sophisticated products. However, product diversification is far from an autonomous process that market forces can induce. Producing new goods is rife with market failures, such as coordination and information externalities (Hausmann and Rodrik 2006) . Coordination failures occur when the return to one investment depends on whether some other investment is also made. Investments in new products are profitable only if other related investments are made simultaneously. If an entrepreneur fails in his investment in new products, he will bear the full cost of his failures. If, however, he succeeds, he will not be fully remunerated because other entrants will easily copy his findings. These failures prevent entrepreneurs from investing in new products by reducing incentives for self-discovery, although their success can produce high social returns. In this context, Hausmann and Rodrik propose a new type of industrial policy targeted at new products.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II analyzes structural transformation in the Kyrgyz Republic through the new tools of Hausmann and Klinger (2007) and Hidalgo et al. (2007) . Section III discusses policy options to facilitate the process of export sophistication in the country. There is a brief summary in the last section.
II. Structural Transformation
The Kyrgyz Republic is a low-income country with a gross national income per capita of $780 as of 2008 (World Bank 2008 . The country is landlocked and mostly mountainous. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country suffered one of the worst economic declines in the region. In 1995, gross domestic product (GDP) declined to 50% of the 1990s level, and all economic indicators deteriorated: hyperinflation, high unemployment, and a rise in poverty. The country has since undertaken significant structural reforms, including land reforms, introduction of the national currency with full convertibility, privatization of state enterprises, and reduction of import tariffs. The business and investment climates have also improved. During the 1990s, the Kyrgyz Republic was one of the leading reformers among former Soviet Union countries, and in 1998, it was the first to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The economy has now become the most open in Central Asia, and it has a liberalized trade regime. Since 1998, the economy has grown at an average of about 4% per annum. This paper's primary source of trade data is the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics. It uses data at the 4-digit level of disaggregation under the SITC Revision 2 classification. There are 779 products at this level. Two adjustments to the data have been made: (i) where export data for some countries were not available, mirror statistics were used, i.e., import data of partner countries were aggregated to estimate the missing export data; and (ii) export values of some commodities were adjusted for prices using the International Monetary Fund Commodity Price Index to remove the effects of the global price hikes during 2001-2006. 1 To exclude "transit" or "re-export" products from the Kyrgyz Republic's exports, export data is estimated based on the available information on the country's re-export products for recent years (Appendix 1). propose to measure the level of sophistication of a country's export basket (EXPY) in two steps. For each product, they compute the weighted average of the real per capita incomes (GDPPC) of the countries exporting that product with comparative advantage, where the weights are Balassa's index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in that product (Balassa 1965) . 2 This index is called PRODY. It provides the income or productivity level associated with a product. Appendix 2 shows the distribution of PRODY of the 786 products, which ranges from $995 to $39,521 (in 2005 purchasing power parity [PPP] ). The EXPY for a country is then computed as the weighted average of the PRODY of the country's export basket, where the weights are the shares of each product in the country's total exports. PRODY (of product i) and EXPY (of country c) are defined as:
where xval ci is the export value of product i by country c. Figure 1 shows the EXPY of the Kyrgyz Republic and those of some comparators. It clearly shows that the successful Asian economies have constantly upgraded their export baskets. In contrast, the path of EXPY of the Kyrgyz Republic does not show the same upward trend. The country's EXPY declined until the end of the 1990s. Restructuring of the Soviet era's state enterprises, which produced relatively sophisticated products such as iron and steel, metal, and industrial machinery, explains this decline (Appendix 3 lists the major products that lost comparative advantage in the transition period). Table 1 and Figure 2 show that the export share of the most sophisticated product group decreased during this period.
Afterwards, the Kyrgyz Republic's EXPY stagnated until 2004, and gradually improved up to 2006. The current level of product sophistication is lower than those of neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and much lower than those of the successful Asian economies. The country's high dependence on traditional less sophisticated products such as gold (nonmonetary), raw cotton, and electric current, is the key factor of this stagnation (Table 2) . Structural transformation in the Kyrgyz Republic can be analyzed by studying the country's product space. Central to the construction of the product space is the idea that the ability of a country to export a new product depends on its ability to export similar products. Hidalgo et al. (2007) capture this notion of similarity between a pair of products, called "proximity", by observing trade outcomes rather than by looking at physical similarities between products or their inputs. A critical assumption here is that if the needed capabilities to produce two different products are similar, this would be revealed in the fact that the countries that export one good also export the other one.
If every country that exports a product also exports another product, then these two products must involve similar capabilities. On the other hand, if every country that exports a product does not export another product, then these two products must involve different capabilities. This led to the use of conditional probabilities to measure the similarity between the two products. "Proximity" is measured as the minimum between the probability that countries export product i given that they already export product j; and the probability that countries export product j given that they already export product i. The reason to take the minimum of the two probabilities is to create a symmetric measure of distance for a pair of products. Formally, the proximity between products i and j is defined as:
where x i = 1 implies that, for every country C and commodity i, RCA ci > 1. Figure 3 shows the product space. The different circles (nodes) represent products, and the node size is proportional to world trade value. Colors represent different product groups according to Leamer's classification by factor intensity. The colors of the lines that connect the nodes represent the distance (proximity) between a pair of products: red is the closest, followed by dark blue, yellow, and light blue. Each product is connected to its closest neighbor and to all others that are at distances that correspond to either red or dark blue lines.
For each product, we can measure the strength of the linkages with other products by simply adding up the proximities leading to that product. This index, called "Path", shows which products are in a dense part of the product space, and which are on the periphery. The path of product i is defined as:
The product space is highly heterogeneous: in the dense part, many products, particularly machinery, chemicals, and other capital-intensive products are closely connected to each other; while in the periphery, products such as natural resources and primary products are only weakly connected to others. This means that products in the core part of the product space involve capabilities that can be redeployed to produce and export many other products; but those in the periphery cannot. Thus, countries that have already established comparative advantage in a well-connected part of the product space can move to other products with much more ease than those that have their export products in the periphery. To visualize the degree of structural transformation that the Kyrgyz Republic has undergone, we highlight, using black squares, the products in which the country has comparative advantage in 1992 , 1996 , 2000 . The country had comparative in several products in the core part of the forest in 1992 and 1996, but most of them disappeared in 2000 (see also Appendix 3). Between 2000 and 2006, some new black squares appeared in the garment cluster and in the core area of the product space. However, in general, black squares are scattered throughout the periphery of the product space, which implies that there is no easy way to redeploy the existing capabilities into new products. How can we assess the potential for future structural transformation in the Kyrgyz Republic? Figure 5 maps the "unexploited products" of the country in the "density" (inverse) and PRODY space. "Unexploited products" are those in which the country has not yet developed comparative advantage. Thus, they can be regarded as an "opportunity set" for the future. "Density" measures how close (far) each unexploited product is to the country's current export basket in terms of the capabilities it requires (Appendix 4). It is calculated as the sum of proximities between product j and all products that are exported with comparative advantage, scaled by the sum of all proximities leading to product j (Path j):
By definition, density ranges between 0 and 1. The closer the density of a product is to 1, the "nearer" the product is to the country's current export basket, thus, the more likely it is to be exported in the future with comparative advantage. The horizontal axis of Figure 5 is the inverse of the density, thus products toward the left side are "nearby", that is, those that use similar capabilities to those used by current export basket.
Compared with the successful Asian countries and Germany, 3 the unexploited product set by the Kyrgyz Republic displays two striking features. First, these products are, as a whole, located far away from the origin. This means that the capabilities embedded in the current export basket can hardly be used. It also means that the Kyrgyz Republic has not yet accumulated enough capabilities to jump into the production and export of sophisticated products. This is in sharp contrast with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India, where the set of unexploited products is very close to their current export baskets. These countries can easily develop comparative advantage in new products by applying the capabilities that they have accumulated.
Second, the distribution of the unexploited products in the Kyrgyz Republic is upwardsloping. This suggests a trade-off between distance and sophistication: the products that are closest to the current export basket are, theoretically, the ones that should be easier to export (because they are the ones that require similar capabilities to the ones the country already has), yet these products are not highly sophisticated. The more sophisticated products are further away. In the cases of the PRC and India, on the other hand, the degree of the trade-off is much lower since their opportunities are distributed on a vertical line. Furthermore, in Germany and Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea), the trade-off totally disappears and sophisticated products are closer to the current export basket than the less sophisticated ones. These countries can quickly upgrade their exports over time through easy jumps to the nearby and sophisticated products. These two features of the Kyrgyz Republic future opportunity set put some question marks on the possibilities and direction of future structural transformation. We address this in the next section. Compared with other countries in the region, the Kyrgyz Republic has a better potential for product diversification, because it already has comparative advantage in several products in the core part of the product space (Appendix 5). As discussed earlier, those products in the core have strong links with other sophisticated products that the country does not yet export with comparative advantage. Hausmann and Klinger (2006) have also developed the concept of "open forest" to measure how valuable a country's unoccupied trees are, by weighting the PRODY of each unexploited product by its distance to the current export products. The open forest for country c is defined as:
A country with a higher open forest value has a better opportunity for product diversification. Table 3 . The relationship is quadratic, an inverted U-shape, indicating that open forest increases until a certain income level (about $27,000 in 2005 PPP) and then starts declining. Open forest varies significantly across countries. There are relatively poor countries that have values of open forest as high as those of countries in the $20,000-40,000 per capita range. PRC, India, Indonesia, and Thailand are included in this group. The Kyrgyz Republic is not comparable with these countries, but it is the only country in Central Asia that has a higher open forest than the international average. This implies that given its income level, the Kyrgyz Republic has a better potential for product diversification. 
III. Policy Options
How can the Kyrgyz Republic diversify its production structure? As discussed earlier, the discovery process is rife with market failures, thus the government needs to intervene to help entrepreneurs jump into new products. For any type of intervention, policymakers need to choose target products. One might think this is because they cannot afford to deal with all products. But a much more important reason is that each product in the country's opportunity set has a different possibility of export success depending on the availability of required capabilities. If there are plenty of nearby products, it is realistic to focus on these products since they can fully utilize the capabilities that the country has already developed.
To this end, we classify all products in the Kyrgyz Republic's unexploited opportunity set (a total of 337 products) into three groups depending on the "distance" from the current export products: "nearby" (Case A, products with inverse density less than 0.5 standard deviations below the average of all unexploited products); "middle" (Case B, products with inverse density between ±0.5 standard deviations around the average); and "far away" (Case C: products with inverse density at least 0.5 standard deviations above the average).
One option for the government is to choose some products from the nearby group (Case A) as targets. There are 177 products in this group. The government needs to choose some products for policy targets. Several different selection criteria can be used. For instance, the government could select the most sophisticated products (i.e., those with a high PRODY); or products that can create more capabilities that can be applied to other products in the opportunity set (i.e., those with a high spill-over effect); or a combination of these criteria. It is also possible to select products with the highest global demand, or those with the highest labor absorption capacity; or the government can develop its own selection criteria depending on its policy priorities.
We show here an example that uses each product's "strategic value" as criterion, which measures the spill-over effect into other products. Products in the dense part of the product space require intensive capabilities that can be easily deployed into a wide range of other goods. Thus, successful production of these goods would create capabilities for other new products. On the other hand, producing goods in the periphery would offer little since capacities involved in these products cannot be easily applied to the export of other products (even if they have high PRODY). We define the "strategic value" of each unexploited product (product j) to capture this spill-over effect as:
for all i in the opportunity set and i ≠ j. The strategic value is the potential contribution of commodity j to the open forest if it is assumed to be exported with comparative advantage (Appendix 4).
Our product selection has two steps: firstly, we choose the unexploited products with higher PRODYs than the national average (EXPY); secondly, we pick up the 20 products with the highest strategic value. Therefore, the selected products can directly improve the country's export sophistication and also facilitate further structural transformation with their spill-over effect into other products. The selected products in each group are listed in Table 4 . Our recommendation here is to select some products from the Case A (nearby) and focus public support on these products. We emphasize that exclusively focusing public action on enhancing production possibilities around the existing capabilities may not produce the leaps that are often required to sustain growth. The Kyrgyz Republic is better positioned in the product space than its neighboring countries. However, compared to the successful Asian economies, the position of the Kyrgyz Republic in the product space is still poor. Therefore, policymakers may need to explore new areas of the product space, even products that are not so close to the current export products. For this reason, policymakers may consider selecting some products from the "middle" (Case B) and/or "far away" (Case C) groups that they would want to develop by providing the necessary public support. This option is more challenging since any product from these groups needs a different set of capabilities that the country probably does not have. In this sense, this option is for "strategic bets" to encourage investors to search for long-term opportunities in the country.
Once policymakers set some product targets, the next question is how to help private firms jump into these new products. There is no clear ex ante answer to this question. To design policies, policymakers need to know the impediments that entrepreneurs would face to export these products successfully. However, only entrepreneurs have such information. Thus, in no way can policymakers devise appropriate policies, ex ante, to help them. An effective solution to this problem is to set up institutions to interact with the private sector to uncover the most significant obstacles when firms try to export Some East Asian governments have developed mechanisms to undertake joint diagnostics with the private sector. For example, "policy councils" (shingikai) played a key role in Japan's diagnostics process, when the country achieved a high growth rate in the 1950s and 1960s, through the use of active industrial policies. The key players involved in the formulation of industrial policy were: (i) genkyoku-bureaus, divisions, and sections within ministries, particularly the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MITI); (ii) industrial associations; and (iii) policy councils. A genkyoku was responsible for one or another part of the relevant industry. Policy councils were consultative bodies whose deliberations were referred to in the process of policy formulation. They consisted of representatives of industry associations, former bureaucrats, scholars, and journalists. Each policy council focused on a specific industry to fit the different priorities, needs, and circumstances in individual industries.
Policy councils were often criticized for being captive to the ministry. However, it was not the case that only issues in the ministry's interest were discussed in the councils. Industry representatives and other members were also actively involved in these discussions to express their views. In fact, policy councils furnished good opportunities for the stakeholders to adjust proposals to reflect their joint interests. In a comprehensive study on Japan's industrial policy, Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura (1988) point out that policy councils were effective in collecting, exchanging, and disseminating information on the industry; on establishing consensus on policy matters; and also on setting up a long-term vision for the industry.
As discussed earlier, it is not possible to devise, ex ante, policy actions for industrial support, since it all depends on the opportunities and constraints that will be identified through the public and private dialogue. These actions can take various forms such as low-cost finance, tax incentives, duty-free imports, subsidies, public research and development, subsidized vocational trainings etc. They may also be a set of standards and regulatory rules on product characteristics, provisions of market information etc. Appropriate forms of industrial support are product-specific. Policymakers need to find out the most appropriate form of intervention through the dialogue process. Nonetheless, it is possible to list some general "design principles" that can inform the formulation of the resulting industrial policies. They can be summarized into the following:
(i) Set clear objectives and targets: Public interventions will support clearly defined objectives, and will target groups of firms that produce/export specific products.
The targets of public support should be viewed not as sectors but as activities. This facilitates structuring the support as a corrective to specific market failures instead of generic support for this or that sector.
(ii)
Set monitoring and evaluation mechanisms with performance indicators and benchmarks: In line with the previous principle, establish benchmarks and use performance indicators to identify and measure outputs and outcomes. Use indicators to regularly monitor and evaluate the performance of firms and the effectiveness of the intervention in meeting objectives. In the absence of a clear idea of what constitutes success and observable criteria for monitoring it, failures can get entrenched. Recipients of subsidies can game public agencies and continue to ask and receive support despite poor outcomes. Bureaucrats administering incentives can claim success and keep their programs running.
(iii) Set sunset clauses and exit strategies: Interventions must be designed with an exit strategy after a fixed period, or after certain milestones are reached. One way to ensure that resources do not remain tied up for a long time in activities that are not paying off is to phase out support by default. Hence, every publicly supported project needs to have not only a clear statement ex ante of what constitutes success and failure, but also an automatic sunset clause for withdrawing support after an appropriate amount of time has elapsed.
(iv) Design interventions as simple and as flexible as possible: Follow a simple design that is easy to administer. Also, interventions must be flexible so that they can be fine-tuned after initial implementation in case they do not show optimal results.
(v) Introduce cost recovery (where applicable): Partial or full cost recovery must be built into the design to ensure sustainability and ownership of the intervention, and to separate the firms that value the service from those seeking free resources.
(vi) Participatory and transparent: Since the proposed dialogue will happen between the government and firms that produce a specific product, all information on public support should be disclosed so as not to give any impression that the government supports only a favored group. Details of the intervention as well as of its implementation and evaluation must meet standards of transparency, i.e., full public disclosure.
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Rodrik (2004) recommend a "carrot-and-stick strategy" in the design of industrial policy. Since self-discovery of new goods requires rents for entrepreneurs, governments need to provide them with a carrot (trade protection, lowcost finance, tax incentives, duty-free imports, etc.). This is important, but not the entire story. Governments also need to use a stick to enforce discipline among recipients of the carrot. To ensure that mistakes are not perpetuated and ineffective policies are phased out, the rents to entrepreneurs should be subjected to performance requirements, particularly export targets. Once policymakers know that a policy cannot work, it should be redesigned or eliminated.
Industrial policies in East Asia included both elements. In Korea and Taipei,China, interventions were always kept in check by the requirement that recipient firms become competitive in world markets, and some subsidies were contingent on their export performance (Rodrik 1994) . Schuman (2009) illustrates an important aspect of Korea's industrial policy: "He set up a "situation room" next to his office to supervise and track programs, held monthly and quarterly meetings with ministers, politicians, bankers, business leaders, and even labor chiefs to check their status. He harassed ministers with persistent phone calls to make sure they were meeting deadlines and targets". "He" is President Park Chung Hee, who laid the foundation of "the Miracle of Han River".
Despite the strong theoretical case and the success stories of the East Asian countries, there remains much opposition to industrial policy. The conventional argument against industrial policy rests on the practical difficulties with its implementation. Governments do not possess enough information that would enable them to target their interventions appropriately (i.e., government cannot "pick winners"). Industrial policy induces corruption and rent seeking, and it works as a form of preferential policy just to transfer scarce public resources to politically connected groups. Our view is that these problems can be resolved by applying the designing principles that we discussed above. Thus, the key question on industrial policy is not "should we or should we not", but "how to make it work" (Rodrik 2007 ). 4
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed structural transformation in the Kyrgyz Republic by examining the level of sophistication in the country's exports. We have found that the level of sophistication in the county's exports is still low, and not comparable with those of the successful Asian economies. The Kyrgyz Republic is not yet well prepared for future jumps into the export of sophisticated products. However, the Kyrgyz Republic has a better opportunity set for structural transformation than other countries in Central Asia, since it has already developed comparative advantage in some products that are linked with the core of the product space. Thus, the key challenge for the Kyrgyz Republic is how to seize these opportunities.
Product diversification is unlikely to take place without direct government intervention due to coordination failures and information spillovers. Industrial policy is thus much needed to help entrepreneurs jump into new products. In this context, we propose that the government undertake a pilot test of the new dialogue mechanism with the private sector for a small group of selected products. A realistic option is to initiate the pilot test with "nearby" products that can fully utilize the existing capabilities. 5 Through the dialogue with the private sector, policymakers need to learn and identify obstacles to investments in new products and to design appropriate policies in response.
In this approach, the pilots with some products may fail. The government may pick up losers rather than winners. Indeed, failures are inevitable. A more important requirement is that the government be able to recognize its mistakes and change course when needed (Rodrik 2007) . In designing policies, it is important to develop a carrot-and-stick strategy, where the effectiveness of industrial support is constantly judged against the yardstick of performance to enforce discipline among entrepreneurs. The best principles of industrial support can work as safeguards against the failures.
To be sure, market forces and private entrepreneurship are the key drivers of development. But it is only the government that could design the long-term vision of the economy. Policymakers need to steer the country's path of capability accumulation to fulfill this vision. Industrial policy is not easy. The government's roles in our argument go far beyond conventional tasks such as macroeconomic stabilization and sound business and investment climate. It requires competent bureaucrats under a strong political leadership that places a high priority on economic development. What matters most is, therefore, the government's "capability" to design the institutional mechanism to remove market failures that block product diversification. The joint diagnosis with the private sector will pave the way for productive diversification that will drive development of the Kyrgyz economy.
Appendix 1: Transit Exports in the Kyrgyz Republic
It is widely recognized that exports of the Kyrgyz Republic contain "transit" or "re-export' products from neighboring countries, particularly from the PRC. As a WTO member country, it has preferential trade agreements with the PRC and other Central Asian countries, which creates an ideal environment for re-exports in the country. The re-exports need to be excluded from the country's export basket because there is no value addition within the country. To estimate the extent of re-exports in our data, we used available re-export data from the UN Comtrade database. Disaggregated re-export data for the Kyrgyz Republic is available for [2005] [2006] [2007] .
The first correction in this exercise is to consider all petroleum products (under SITC 3-digit codes 333, 334, and 335) as re-exports since it is known that the Kyrgyz Republic does not produce these commodities. From this exercise it was found that the biggest re-export of the country, "Petroleum products, refined" (334), which accounts for about 60% of re-exports during 2005-2007, is not reflected under the 4-digit SITC classification. This implies that the data has already accounted for most of the country's re-exports, and explains the smaller re-export ratios estimated. To account for the remaining re-exports, the country's average re-export ratio for each commodity group from 2005 to 2007 is used and applied to previous years. Appendix Figure 1 .1 shows the estimated export values that exclude re-exports and the re-export ratios during 1995-2005. While available information about re-exports at a disaggregated product level is limited, the estimate shows that there is no significant change in the findings above even if we re-exports using the 4-digit SITC classification are excluded. Appendix Figure 1 .2 shows a comparison between the product space of the Kyrgyz Republic for "adjusted (without re-exports)" and "unadjusted (with reexports)". In Table 1 and Figure 2 in the text, the products are classified into five quintiles depending on the level of sophistication: very high (top 20%), high, average, low, and very low (lowest 20%). This appendix illustrates how these indices are computed with a simple example. Suppose that there are only five commodities C i (i=1, 2,.., 5) in the product space, and country A exports commodities C 1 and C 2 with comparative advantage, and other products (C 3 , C 4 , and C 5 ) are unexploited products (no comparative advantage). Appendix Figure 4 .1 shows the product space of this country. 
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Appendix
Density
Density is defined for each unexploited product. In this example, an unexploited product, say product C 5 , links with four products (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , and C 4 ). Each link with C 5 has a different value of proximity. Some links are with products that have comparative advantage (C 1 and C 2 ), but others are with unexploited products (C 3 and C 4 ). Density of C 5 is the sum of proximities with products that are currently exported with comparative advantage, divided by the sum of proximities with all products. If ϕ ij is the proximity between products i and j, i j ≠ , the density of C 5 in country A is: 
By definition, density ranges between 0 and 1. If an unexploited product has links only with products that have comparative advantage, the density of that product is equal to 1. This implies that it is highly likely that the unexploited product can be exported in the future since required capabilities for that product are already developed for producing other products.
Open Forest
Open forest measures the value of unexploited products at the country level taking account the distance from the country's current export products. Open forest is defined as: 
PRODY PRODY
Note that the weight of a PRODY above corresponds to the density of each unexploited product. Open forest of a country thus depends on: how close the unexploited products are to the products in which the country has already developed comparative advantage; and how sophisticated the unexploited products are. A higher value of open forest implies more opportunities to jump to new products.
Strategic Value
Successful export of each unexploited product has a different spill-over effect into other unexploited products, since each product involves a different set of capabilities. Some products can provide capabilities that can be applied to a wide range of products, but others cannot. The strategic value of a product precisely provides this information.
In the example, there are three unexploited products (C 3 , C 4 , and C 5 ). Suppose country A will acquire comparative advantage in C 5 . Successful production of this product creates a new set of capabilities that entrepreneurs can also apply for C 3 and C 4 . The strategic value of product C 5 is defined as: 
Strategic value PRODY
